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Abstract: It is generally acknowledged by both philosophers of science and by Hume scholars that Hume’s classic 
analysis of perceptions and knowledge of matters of fact push strongly toward scepticism about unobservable 
entities, such as those typically postulated in theories of the natural sciences. Intriguingly, though, Hume has not 
only written approvingly of certain scientific theories referring to unobservable objects, but also introduced himself 
several hypotheses about unobservable entities and processes in his own “science of man”. This article aims to pinpoint 
and comment some of the main passages of his works in which Hume appears to take a positive stance toward 
unobservables, in certain particular instances. If correct, this analysis would constitute a piece of evidence against 
the usual belief that the empiricist epistemological theory developed by Hume would constitute an impeditive 
framework for any form of scientific realism.
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Hume sobre entidades inobserváveis
Resumo: Constitui opinião comum entre filósofos da ciência e historiadores da filosofia moderna que a clássica análise 
de Hume da percepção e do conhecimento de questões de fato que escapam ao testemunho dos sentidos aponta 
fortemente para o ceticismo quanto ao conhecimento de entidades inobserváveis, como as que são tipicamente 
postuladas por teorias das ciências naturais. Não obstante, Hume não apenas expressou aprovação a certas teorias 
científicas que putativamente se referem a itens inobserváveis como também introduziu, ele próprio, diversas 
hipóteses sobre entidades e processos inobserváveis em sua “ciência do homem”. Este artigo objetiva a identificar e 
comentar algumas das passagens de suas obras em que Hume parece, de fato, assumir uma posição positiva quanto 
a inobserváveis, em casos particulares. Se assim for, a presente análise contribuirá para por em questão a crença 
usual de que a teoria epistemológica empirista desenvolvida por Hume forma um referencial hostil a qualquer forma 
de realismo científico.
Palavras‑chave: David Hume, empirismo, hipóteses científicas, realismo científico, entidades inobserváveis, filosofia 
natural.
1. Introduction. Empiricism and scientific realism.
Scientific realism was one of the main subjects of debate in philosophy of science in the last decades of 
the 20th century. The work that, individually, contributed the most to bring this issue to the forefront of 
philosophical analysis was Bas van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image (1980). Preliminary to the defence of a 
new form of scientific anti‑realism, the book offers, in chap. 2, a survey several proposals in the literature for 
the proper characterization of scientific realism. Quite independently of one’s opinion about van Fraassen’s 
specific theses and arguments, it must be acknowledged that this survey represents a valuable contribution 
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to the clarification of the conceptual contours of the discussion. In particular, his definition of scientific 
realism seems to capture the core of this doctrine, without burdening it with misleading accessories.
According to van Fraassen, by scientific realism we are to understand the view that “[s]cience aims to give 
us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves 
the belief that it is true” (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, p. 8). This definition has the merit of focusing on the 
aim of science – purportedly, truth –, and not on the epistemic credentials of any of its particular theories 
for claiming that this aim has been reached. Also, it avoids clothing the position in linguistic dressings, as 
was done in decades of largely inconclusive debate between the logical positivists and their critics. That old 
debate, let us recall, hinged on whether it was possible (and, if possible, desirable) to cleanse the language 
of science of the so‑called “theoretical terms”. Typically, the defenders of this procedure – the anti‑scientific 
realists of the day ‑ assumed that, in contrast with the “empirical”, or “observational” terms, such terms would 
be destitute of legitimate meaning; and in holding this view they believed they were simply adopting a 
theory of meaning whose roots dated back to the classical “empiricists”, in particular, David Hume1. Several 
strategies for eliminating theoretical terms from scientific theories have been proposed. With the advantage 
of hindsight, we can see that none of them have done much headway in advancing the anti‑realist project.
Instead of entering into this worn out debate, van Fraassen has convincingly argued that the whole 
eliminative enterprise of the logical positivists is misguided, since all terms in the language of science are, 
in certain a sense, theoretical. It is, therefore, vain to try to defend an anti‑scientific realist position on the 
basis of a supposed line separating the theoretical from the empirical terms. Furthermore, van Fraassen 
has shown that what the anti‑realist needs is not such an impossible line, but an epistemological criterion for 
distinguishing the items, in a theory, deserving to be believed, in contrast with those about which she would 
recommend an agnostic stance. And the criterion proposed by van Fraassen is, in a word, observability: 
entities and processes referred to by a scientific theory, literally construed, could be legitimate object of 
belief only if they are in principle observable. Thus, according to this suggestion, the epistemic appraisal of a 
scientific theory would hinge solely on its “empirical adequacy”, i.e. its capacity to fit the observable data, 
not on its truth simpliciter (which includes the theory’s fit to any aspect of the word, observable or not). 
Accordingly, van Fraassen expressed his own position – which he named “constructive empiricism” – in 
these words: “Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a theory 
involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate” (VAN FRAASSEN, 1980, p. 12).
It is easy to see that van Fraassen philosophical move bypasses the problem of sorting out the terms of the 
language of science into theoretical and non‑theoretical (or empirical), but only at the price of generating a 
(seemingly) new problem, that of sorting out the observable from the unobservable entities and processes 
in science. He was aware of this crucial problem, of course, but has surprisingly given only a perfunctory 
solution to it in his ground‑breaking book: he holds that we should count as observable the items that 
could in principle be observed by unaided human sensorial organs. As expected, critics were quick to point 
out the existence of many difficulties and paradoxes in this apparently crude, anthropocentric observability 
criterion; and it is a matter of dispute whether van Fraassen has succeeded in countering these criticisms2.
It does not belong to the scope of this paper to discuss the still alive debate on this important topic. I will 
simply assume, for the sake of advancing my views on a related, but less explored issue, that van Fraassen’s 
observability criterion is a viable option. An additional motivation for adopting this criterion is the fact that 
the whole history of science (or, in earlier times, “natural philosophy”) is marked by a clear awareness, on 
the part of its main protagonists, that, in the epistemological analysis of a theory, its assertions about the 
unobservable aspects of the world require a treatment differing substantially from that of its statements 
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about empirical matters. At least from Descartes onwards, virtually all the main scientists who contributed 
to the development of the natural sciences have offered some epistemological justification for their ambition 
to transcend the limits of human senses, whether by appealing to magnifying devices or by arguing that 
their very theories constituted appropriate intellectual tools for probing deeper into the natural world.
What is little noticed in the literature is that many, if not most, of the leading figures the so‑called “empiricist” 
school of philosophy, such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, did not see their epistemological position as 
necessarily ruling out this age‑old goal of science. In contrast with their classical predecessors, however, 
contemporary empiricists tend to assume that empiricism would automatically render impossible any defence 
of scientific realism. I have argued elsewhere that this is a mistake (CHIBENI, 1997). Empiricism should be 
taken as a thesis on the foundations of knowledge, whereas realism is a thesis on its limits, or extension. But the 
association of empiricism with anti‑realism is now so widespread in the literature in the philosophy of science 
that scientific anti‑realism is often called “empiricism”. Such misleading use of the term is common not only 
among the anti‑scientific realists (e.g. van Fraassen’s “constructive empiricism”), but also among the scientific 
realists themselves (see e.g. BOYD, 1984). This is quite surprising, for if the “empiricists” are identified, in 
the debate, with the anti‑realists, the scientific realists would be left in the uncomfortable position of being, 
perhaps, identified with the rationalists – the classical, and proper, opponents of the empiricists. But nowadays 
apparently nobody would feel confortable in being classed as a “rationalist” in philosophy of science3.
I will not resume here my former analyses of these issues. My present goal is to explore, if only tentatively, 
some aspects of the work of one of the leading figures of classical empiricism, David Hume, in order to 
show that, contrary to his self‑declared followers in contemporary philosophy of science – from the logical 
positivists to van Fraassen4 – he did not see his positions on the issue of the foundations of knowledge 
(“empiricism”, in the proper sense of the word) as automatically ruling out any scientific theory purporting 
to describe what is behind the observable aspects of the world (i.e. the phenomena). My choice of Hume 
as an object of analysis has three motives. First, Hume is generally acknowledged as the most important 
empiricist philosopher of all times. Second and third, Hume not only acknowledged the unprecedented 
achievements of the new natural philosophers, but also sought to inaugurate a new approach to the study 
of human nature explicitly inspired by the methods and values of natural philosophy5.
It is generally acknowledged, both by Hume scholars and by philosophers of science, that Hume’s analysis 
of perceptions and knowledge of matters of fact pushes toward scepticism about any theory postulating 
unobservable entities. I do not deny this; on the contrary, I have elsewhere examined and fully acknowledged 
the existence of several serious difficulties in making room for scientific realism in a general Humean 
epistemological framework (CHIBENI, 2005). There is, first, the fact that Hume’s theory of ideas does not 
seem to allow the existence of ideas of unobservable entities. Ideas are, let us recall, the basic materials of 
any kind of knowledge, and should, according to Hume, be “copied” from preceding “impressions”. Thus, 
the very talk of such entities risks of becoming meaningless, by Hume’s influential criterion of meaning 
(see footnote 1, above), which associates the meaning of a word to the existence of an idea in the mind. 
Secondly, the inferential based on causal relations, essential, according to Hume, to justify belief in anything 
that has not been observed, is a fortiori inapplicable to the case of unobservable matters of fact, as Hume 
noticed in his discussion of realism about ordinary bodies (which, let us recall, are also unobservables, if 
construed metaphysically, as “substances”).
Furthermore, Hume himself issued explicit warnings against hypotheses going beyond what can, in 
principle, be observed. Perhaps the most conspicuous of these warnings is the passage in the Abstract in 
which Hume remarks, famously, that “the author of the Treatise” (i.e. Hume himself)
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proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner, and promises to draw no conclusions but where he is 
authorized by experience. He talks with contempt of hypotheses; and insinuates, that such of our countrymen as 
have banished them from moral philosophy, have done a more signal service to the world, than my Lord Bacon, 
whom he considers as the father of experimental physicks. (Abs. 2; see also THN 1.4.6.23.).
Particularly interesting in this quotation is the parallel drawn by Hume between the “science of man”, or 
“science of human nature” – his grand project for the study of the mind –, and anatomy, which is (or was, at 
that time) a phenomenological branch of natural science. In the Enquiry we find a similar instance of the same 
point, this time involving a comparison with another phenomenological scientific discipline, geography:
And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, 
it is at least a satisfaction to go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no means obvious) 
the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy. 
(EHU 1.13; see also EHU 4.4).
These passages may suggest that Hume’s intention was to restrict the enquiries and principles of the “science 
of man” to the phenomenological level, rejecting any conjecture about unobservable mental mechanisms 
and processes. But, as I will try to show in the sequel, Hume’s sceptical remarks on hypotheses, especially 
those involving unobservable entities, should be taken cum grano salis. It is arguable that the parallel of 
his own science of man with anatomy and geography is actually intended to indicate the epistemic priority, 
not the exclusivity, of the phenomenological level in the sciences generally, as compared with theoretical 
conjectures going beyond experience; the latter being important, however, when deeper explanations of 
the phenomena are sought for.
2. Unobservable entities in Hume’s “science of man”.
As a starting point, I will take a passage from the Enquiry coming just two paragraphs below the paragraph 
partly quoted above, in which Hume seems to be ready to consider seriously the possibility of an extension 
of the science of man beyond the observational level:
But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may 
carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human 
mind is actuated in its operations? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phaenomena, 
the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from 
the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are 
governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to 
despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and oeconomy, if prosecuted with equal capacity 
and caution. (EHU 1.15; my italics).
If taken at face value, these words suggest that Hume’s indictments on hypotheses should be construed 
as deliberate overstatements, intended to underline the epistemic priority of experience over theorizations 
on unobservables. Close attention to his epistemological works, and to what Hume has effectively done 
as a scientist of the human nature, indicates, indeed, that his stand toward hypotheses does not seem to 
be uniformly contemptuous. When Hume discusses several specific cases belonging to the scope of the 
natural sciences – his explicitly avowed methodological model – he seems to relax the strict constraints 
imposed by his theories of ideas and causal inferences, in order to make room for the successful explanatory 
hypotheses already devised by the scientists of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This topic 
will be examined in the next section. Furthermore, in constructing his own science of human nature Hume 
put forward a series of hypotheses on the functioning of the mind. Arguably, some, or perhaps all, of them 
postulate the existence of unobservable mental processes. Elsewhere, I have discussed some relevant cases 
of use of hypotheses in Hume’s science of man (CHIBENI, 2005, sect. 5). I concluded that hypotheses 
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going beyond the empirical level play essential roles in his epistemological theory. The most important 
cases in which Hume himself says he is framing, or endorsing, hypotheses are:
i) The explanation of the function of general terms (THN 1.1.7.1 and 16);
ii) The “system of the double existence” (THN 1.4.2.52);
iii) The thesis that custom is the determinant of causal inferences (EHU 5.5);
iv) The reason of animals (THN 1.3.16.2)6;
v) An explanation of the nature of belief (THN 1.3.7.3);
vi) Purported attempts to solve certain problems related personal identity (THN, Appendix, 21).
The analysis of these quite complex cases will not be resumed here. I wish now to focus on another, more 
peculiar set of passages in which Hume discusses the epistemological status of hypotheses explicitly involving 
unobservables. Let us consider, first, what Hume says in a seldom‑noticed paragraph in the middle of his rather 
lengthy and technical discussion of the paradoxes involving space, time and infinity (THN 1.2.5.20). In order 
to explain certain “mistakes and sophisms” related to this issue, he is led to devise a series of hypotheses on 
the physiological correlates of the phenomenological principles of association of ideas. When first presenting 
the all‑important principles of association of ideas, Hume compares them to “a gentle force” connecting our 
ideas, without which they would be “entirely loose and unconnected” (THN 1.1.4.1). He adds that although 
their “effects are every where conspicuous” (i.e. we can directly discover the phenomenological pattern 
according to which the principles operate, namely, resemblance, contiguity and causation), their causes “are 
mostly unknown, and must be resolv’d into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain” 
(THN 1.1.4.6). Notwithstanding these remarks, in the mentioned passage of part 2, book 1 of the Treatise 
Hume does frame hypotheses on the possible neurological, causal mechanisms of the principles of association:
When [in THN 1.1.4] I receiv’d the relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, as principles of union among 
ideas, without examining into their causes, ’twas more in prosecution of my first maxim, that we must in the end 
rest contented with experience, than for want of something specious and plausible, which I might have display’d 
on that subject. ’Twou’d have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why 
upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other 
ideas, that are related to it7. But tho’ I have neglected any advantage, which I might have drawn from this topic in 
explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I must here have recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes 
that arise from these relations. I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow’d with a power of exciting any 
idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac’d; these 
spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs 
to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this 
reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that, which the 
mind desir’d at first to survey. […] (THN 1.2.5.20).
It is, of course, arguable that this reference to the hypothetical material counterparts of the mental 
processes is merely metaphorical. But a more literal reading should not be ruled out without further 
examination. The hypotheses put forward by Hume in this paragraph – deriving from Descartes’ and 
Malebranche’s psychophysical theories – are explicitly considered by him as providing a “plausible” 
explanation for the phenomenological laws of the association of ideas. Furthermore, similar conjectures 
on unobservable entities and mechanisms in the nervous system can be found in several other passages 
of Hume’s works. One of them is intended to explain the phenomenological “maxim” according to which 
“when any impression becomes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas as are related 
to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity” (THN 1.3.8.2). Hume’s initial 
justification of this maxim (under which the important principle of habit is subsumed) is framed in terms 
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of the same set of hypotheses employed in the explanation of the association of ideas, namely, neurological 
hypotheses on the “elevation” of the animal spirits, their assuming “a new direction”, etc. (THN 1.3.8.2).
Notice, however, that in the following paragraph Hume acknowledges – consistently with his general 
epistemic hierarchy – that in order to “prove” the maxim he “place[s] [his] chief confidence in experience”. It 
follows, then, the enumeration of six “experiments” designed to support this maxim. Thus, we may perhaps 
conclude that, similarly to the principles of association of ideas, the maxim of the transfusion of vivacity 
from impressions to ideas has a “dual” character: mental‑phenomenological and physical‑ontological (the 
latter getting into the unobservable level).
A third passage in which Hume speculates about the brain’s minute “pipes or canals”, though which the 
animal spirits would flow, occurs two sections ahead, in THN 1.3.10.7 and 9, again in an effort to supplement 
and explain certain phenomenological laws which regulate the workings of the mind.
3. Unobservable entities in natural philosophy.
I will now consider some of the many passages in which Hume refers to unobservable entities and processes 
in the realm of natural philosophy8. Several of them involve the attempt – central in Hume’s philosophical 
project – to draw parallels between the methods of natural philosophy and those that should, according to 
him, be employed in the study of human nature. Let us begin resuming the already partly quoted paragraph 
15 of EHU 1. In that paragraph, as we saw, Hume expresses his view that we can reasonably hope that 
the science of man may possibly go beyond the descriptive level of the “mental geography”, in order to 
“discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles by which the human mind is actuated 
in its operations”. This remark is followed by an explicit reference to similar advances which, he thought, 
had already been achieved by the natural philosophers:
Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, and 
magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to 
have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The 
like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. (EHU 1.15; my italics).
The “philosopher” to whom Hume refers is, of course, Newton. Notice the explicit distinction between 
the phenomenological level (the motions of the celestial bodies) and the hypothetical level (the “forces by 
which the revolutions of the planets are governed”). Forces, let us recall, are unobservable, hypothetical 
entities par excellence (if interpreted realistically). But, in apparent contrast with this view, we may cite 
a passage of the Treatise in which Hume draws a sceptical, general philosophical lesson from the study of 
the principles of association of ideas:
Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of searching into causes, 
and having establish’d any doctrine upon a sufficient number of experiments, rest contented with that, when he 
sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain speculations. In that case his enquiry wou’d 
be much better employ’d in examining the effects than the causes of his principle. (THN 1.1.4.6).
This is one of the many passages explored by commentators who defend that Hume is entirely sceptical 
about any attempt to extend human knowledge beyond experience. But there is an alternative reading that 
favours my interpretive option. Indeed, Hume’s qualms about going beyond what the experiments directly 
show are not unqualified: “(…) when he sees a farther examination would lead him into obscure and uncertain 
speculations”. Notice that this important proviso is perfectly adequate to accommodate the case in natural 
philosophy that inspired Hume to write the above paragraph: Newton’s quest for the cause of gravitation. 
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As is well known, Newton believed that he had discovered the common cause of countless terrestrial and 
celestial phenomena, namely, the force of gravity. But, in the Principia, he warned that he would not frame 
hypotheses on the cause of the gravitational force9. This is generally acknowledged by Newton scholars as 
being only a cautious, “official” expression of his position, since he did hope to make further progress in the 
discovery of causes of gravitation. In fact, as we came to know from his correspondence, he actually toiled 
with some curious hypotheses, generally evoking invisible and imponderable fluids, to explain gravitation 
mechanically. Being, however, aware of their crudeness – seeing perhaps that they “would lead him into 
obscure and uncertain speculations” – he refrained to present them in his magnum opus.
Notice, now, that even if we stop scientific inquiry at the point indicated by Hume we shall have already 
gone beyond the merely phenomenological regularities, since forces are not observable, as I have already 
remarked. The parallel between Newton and Hume, according to the construal favoured in this paper, is, 
thus, complete10.
Several other passages also seem to disavow the present interpretation. I begin with one found in THN 
1.2.5.26 and part of its footnote, added in the Appendix to the Treatise:
[M]y intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain the secret causes of their operations. 
For besides that this belongs not to my present purpose, I am afraid, that such an enterprize is beyond the 
reach of human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body otherwise than by those external 
properties, which discover themselves to the senses. As to those who attempt any thing farther, I cannot approve 
of their ambition, till I see, in some one instance at least, that they have met with success. But at present I content 
myself with knowing perfectly the manner in which objects affect my senses, and their connections with each 
other, as far as experience informs me of them. This suffices for the conduct of life; and this also suffices for my 
philosophy, which pretends only to explain the nature and causes of our perceptions, or impressions and ideas. 
(THN 1.2.5.26; my italics).
As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions 
concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrass’d by any 
question. […] If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearance of the objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most 
of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty. […] Nothing is more suitable to that [Newtonian] 
philosophy than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed 
human capacity. (THN 1.2.5.26, footnote, Appendix; my italics).
These statements are repeated in almost the same words in THN 2.3.1.3‑4 and in the Abstract 32. Similar 
remarks are made by Philo, Hume’s fictional spokesman in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, on the 
principles of reason, instinct, generation and vegetation11. Returning now to the Enquiry, in the paragraph 
immediately before the one of the last quoted passage, we read:
It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only 
the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on 
which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence 
of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities, which fit it for the nourishment and 
support of a human body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as to that wonderful 
force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies 
never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. (EHU 4.16).
Thus, according to Hume, the causes of nutrition and inertia would be unknown, and perhaps also 
unknowable to us. I submit that the sceptical remarks in all the above passages concern the particular 
cases Hume is discussing, since, as we have also seen, in other cases he adopts a positive stance toward 
unobservables. Thus, he seems, quite sensibly, to have adopted a case‑by‑case strategy for examining the 
epistemic credentials of the many scientific hypotheses of the natural sciences of his time. Such strategy 
is, of course, the one adopted by any sensible scientific realist, since scientific realism does not imply that 
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all hypotheses and theories of science are equally qualified for being true. It is interesting now to test this 
interpretive proposal against what Hume writes in EHU 4.12:
It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of natural phenomena, 
to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings 
from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt 
their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate 
springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, 
communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever 
discover in nature; and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and reasoning, we can 
trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, these general principles. (EHU 4.12; my italics).
At first sight, this passage seems to insist on the same sceptical themes as those of EHU 4.16. However, what 
Hume says here deserves closer scrutiny. The principles productive of natural phenomena to which Hume 
refers are, obviously, their inner, unobservable causal mechanisms. As Hume remarks in the Introduction 
to the Treatise, one of the typical methodological principles of science is precisely the continued attempt 
to “reduce” principles of a lower level of generality to more general principles. In the passage we are now 
considering, Hume apparently introduces an epistemological cut just after the first step in this process of 
reduction. But there seems to be no principled reason for placing the cut at this point, since in many of the 
cases allowed as legitimate by Hume, here and elsewhere, the first explanatory step is already a step into the 
unobservable (gravitational and elastic forces, inertia, etc.). It is tempting, therefore, to take Hume’s cut as 
a contingent one, determined by the actual development of science of his time. The fact that Newton and 
the vast majority of natural scientists did not at all let their research to be curtailed by philosophical qualms 
about unobservables lends further plausibility to this view.
In connection with this point, it is worth examining other passages in Hume’s writings in which he does 
not seem to be embarrassed by sceptical restraints. Very little noticed by commentators, but relevant to 
the present analysis, is, for instance, a set of paragraphs in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (D 
136‑137), where Cleanthes (the moderator) defends a robust realist construal of the “minute anatomy of 
the rays of light” made by Newton in the corpuscularian theory put forward in the Opticks, as well as of the 
Copernican astronomical system, which also involves unobservable items, such as epicycles, the absolute 
motion of the Earth, etc. In face of this defence, Hume’s spokesman, Philo, remains completely silent. This 
atypical reaction may suggest that he had no objections to Cleanthes realist position.
But perhaps the most striking passages upholding the interpretive possibility I am proposing in this 
paper are those in which Hume endeavours to defend the thesis – central in his philosophy as a whole 
– that “chance is nothing real in itself ” (THN 1.3.11.4), or that “there [is] no such thing as Chance in 
the world” (E 6.1)12. His argument takes as a starting point the fact that, in his time, natural philosophy 
had already exhibited considerable success in discovering “secret causes” in the operation of bodies. 
The search for such causes was motivated precisely by the desire to explain why apparently random 
events happen. Rhubarb, for instance, does not always purge, nor opium make sleep (EHU 6.4). But 
once sufficiently deep, generally unobservable, causes are discovered and taken into account, complete 
regularity is recovered. This view is expressed in a passage of the Treatise (1.3.12.5), reproduced ipsis 
litteris in the Enquiry (8.13):
The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events to such an 
uncertainty in the causes, as makes them often fail of their usual influence, tho’ they meet with no obstacle nor 
impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing that almost in every part of nature there is contain’d a vast 
variety of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness or remoteness, find that ‘tis at least possible 
the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the secret operation of 
contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation, when they remark, that upon 
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an exact scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes, and proceeds from their mutual 
hindrance and opposition. (THN 1.3.12.5; EHU 8.13; my italics).
Thus, the “operation of secret causes” is at first judged possible by the scientists. Then, through “farther 
observation” this possibility is “converted into certainty”. What could these additional observations be? 
The reality of “secret” causes cannot, on pain of inconsistence, be established by direct experience, since by 
‘secret’ Hume means ‘unobservable’. Thus, some inferential process would necessarily be involved here. But 
what kind of inference would this be? Since logical and inductive inferences are of no avail in this case, the 
only remaining possibility seems to be abductive inferences13. Abduction is indeed the main tool explored 
by scientific realists to argue that the limits of direct perception can be transcended. Investigation of the 
presence of this form of inference in Hume’s thought, and in particular, in the defence of his own hypotheses 
involving unobservables, constitutes a topic of its own, which will not be pursued here14.
4. Concluding remarks.
In one of his many cunning comments on the epistemological status of his own theories of the microscopic 
structure of bodies, Descartes said that “we greatly wrong human reason […] if we suppose that it does not 
go beyond the eye‑sight”15. Centuries before this issue became known by its present name, Descartes was, 
in this passage and in several other of The Principles of Philosophy, effectively discussing scientific realism. 
He was, of course, particularly well equipped to enter (in fact, to inaugurate) the debate, being one of the 
founding fathers of both modern epistemology and modern science. Nowadays, the rich historical roots of 
the issue are generally neglected in the specialized literature in the philosophy of science. Having examined 
Descartes’ arguments pro and con scientific realism elsewhere (CHIBENI, 1993), in the present paper I 
tried to shed additional light on the debate by analysing the position of another important philosopher of 
the modern period, David Hume.
Being one of the classic references in empiricist epistemology, Hume’s work is particularly worth reviewing, 
since contemporary authors often assume, without much historical or philosophical discussion, that 
scientific realism is incompatible with empiricism. My main goal here has been to call this assumption into 
question, not by a purely analytical approach (which I believe is also necessary and fruitful), but by a direct 
examination of Hume’s own position about a series of particular cases in which the natural philosophers 
of his time posited unobservable entities and processes, in an effort to explain phenomena of the natural 
world. I have also considered a number of Hume’s own hypotheses involving unobservables, introduced 
in his “science of man” with similar explanatory purposes. I do not intend, of course, that this interpretive 
exercise would constitute, if taken in isolation of other arguments, a sufficient basis for defending scientific 
realism. But I do believe that it should at least give us pause to consider more critically the usual assumption 
that empiricism would, per se, be an impassable barrier to any hope of human mind to transcend the narrow 
limits of sense perception.
As I remarked in the Introduction, and as we saw throughout the text, Hume was fully aware that 
empiricism represented, indeed, a serious challenge to scientific realism. But to the extent that there seems 
to be no viable option for empiricism, as a doctrine on the foundations of scientific knowledge, anyone 
wishing to avoid Descartes’ indictment (i.e. to restrict knowledge to the narrow limits of the senses) must 
face that challenge. Many, if not most, of the leading figures of modern science and epistemology have 
effectively worked on this front. Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, for example, have all contributed 
to the debate16. In Hume’s works, there isn’t – as in the other three cases – an explicit, separate discussion 
of the topic. Notwithstanding, as we have seen, he stumbled into the problem in many specific instances, 
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both in natural philosophy and in the “science of man”. And, when he did, he did not refrain to consider 
seriously any hypothesis about unobservables. Like any good natural philosopher, he did take them as 
bona fide candidates for expressing knowledge. This conclusion goes against two traditional interpretive 
positions, according to which Hume was a complete sceptic with respect to anything transcending sense 
experience; and that, in any event, a robust adhesion to any empiricist epistemology would render scientific 
realism wholly untenable.
We could perhaps close this article in Humean‑style, saying that Hume’s texts on the issue of the 
epistemological status of unobservable entities exhibit an oscillation – typical in his analyses of several 
other subjects – between a sceptical stance, informed by a strictly empiricist epistemological analysis, 
and a more positive stance, informed by the theoretical achievements of the natural sciences, which were 
already rather impressive in Hume’s time. Here we have, therefore, another nice instance of what Hume 
aptly, and famously, called “mitigated scepticism” (EHU 12.24)17.
NOTES
1. The usual reference to Hume’s theory of meaning is the last paragraph of section 2 of the Enquiry concerning Human 
Understanding. In this paper I will adopt the usual convention to refer to Hume’s books, that is: ‘THN x.y.z.t’ stands 
for the Treatise of Human Nature, book x, part y, chapter z, paragraph t, as numbered in the standard OUP edition 
by Norton & Norton; ‘EHU p.q’ stands for the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, section p, paragraph q, 
as numbered in the standard OUP edition by Tom Beauchamp; and ‘Abs. r’ denotes the Abstract to the Treatise, 
paragraph r, again, in the Norton & Norton edition. References to the Dialogues will be given by page numbers of 
Kemp Smith’s classic edition.
2. For a sample of the many works in the literature devoted to the analysis and criticism of van Fraassen’s positions, see 
CHURCHLAND; HOOKER, 1985, and LEPLIN, 1984. The former collection contains a substantial reply by van 
Fraassen. Among the more recent books containing original defences of scientific realism, as against van Fraassen’s 
constructive empiricism, are, for instance, LEPLIN, 1997, PSILLOS, 1999 and LIPTON, 2004.
3. The titles of a paper and of another book by van Fraassen (“Empiricism in the philosophy of science”, 1985, and 
The Empirical Stance, 2002) are apt to lead us to think that, in these works, he would offer an extensive analysis and 
justification of his deliberate conflation of “empiricism” with anti‑scientific realism (of the sort, at least, that he favours). 
But, unfortunately, he does not.
4. In this respect it is worth remarking that in the 1929 Vienna Circle manifesto Hume is explicitly included in the 
list of “precursors” of the logical positivist.
5. Besides many well‑known laudatory references to natural philosophy throughout his works, let us just recall that this 
point is indicated already in the subtitle of his main book: “A Treatise of Human Nature. Being an attempt to introduce 
the experimental method of reasoning into the moral subjects”.
6. On this case, see CHIBENI, 2014.
7. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, let us recall, animal spirits were widely held to be the material components 
of certain subtle, invisible fluids performing a series of important physiological functions in human and animal bodies.
8. For a more general discussion of Hume’s stance toward natural philosophy, see CHIBENI, 2003.
9. Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, General Scholium, p. 457. For a discussion of Newton’s 
position on the role of hypothesis in natural philosophy, see CHIBENI, 2013.
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10. The influence of Newton on Hume is a topic of perennial debate amongst Hume scholars. For a robust defence of 
the existence of methodological and philosophical parallels between Newton and Hume, see CAPALDI, 1975; for the 
contrary position, see JONES, 1982. Angela Coventry (2005) adopts a middle‑term position; her paper contains several 
updated references to the interpretive debate. Notice that in principle these parallels could be sought in a direction 
completely different from that which I am taking here, if one assumes that both Newton and Hume adopted a purely 
phenomenological, or “inductivist” approach to science. I believe that this view is no longer tenable, although it has 
seduced several historians of science and of philosophy in the past. It results mainly from a de‑contextualised reading 
of Newton’s famous declaration that he “frame[d] no hypotheses” (Principia, General Scholium, p. 547), and from 
Hume’s similar declaration in the Abstract, as quoted in the Introduction of this paper. For a relatively recent defence 
of the interpretation of Hume as a phenomenalist, and therefore, a scientific anti‑realist, see ROSENBERG, 1993.
11. Referring to these principles, Philo – Hume’s spokesman – comments: “The effects of these principles are all known 
to us from experience: But the principles themselves, and their manner of operation are totally unknown...” (D 178).
12. For a detailed analysis of Hume’s stance on this issue, see CHIBENI, 2012.
13. Although effectively present in philosophical argumentation from time immemorial, this kind of inference was 
brought to the front of philosophical analysis only by Charles S. Peirce (see PEIRCE, 1934‑1935). Later, Gilbert 
Harman (1965, 1968) proposed to call these inferences simply “inferences to the best explanation”. This suggestion 
became widely accepted in the literature on the philosophy of science.
14. I have elsewhere (CHIBENI, 2005) examined, and suggested tentative solutions to the difficulties involving the 
attempt to legitimise abductive inferences in the framework of Hume’s epistemological theory. The main problem 
is the fact that this kind of inference depend crucially on the notion of explanation, which in its turn is classically 
conceived as involving the notion of cause; but in the present case there is, as pointed out in the text, a fundamental 
problem in establishing causal relations between putative unobservable entities and phenomena.
15. Les Principes de la Philosophie, Book IV, paragraph 201.
16. For an examination of Locke’s and Berkeley’s positions on the epistemological status science, see CHIBENI, 
2005 and 2010.
17. I wish to thank Claudiney Jose de Sousa for several useful comments on a previous draft of this text.
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